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MISINFORMATION, 
MISREPRESENTATION, AND MISUSE OF 





“Behavioral genetics” does not describe a single field with a single set of 
methodological tools, nor does it describe a single explanatory project.  Rather, 
different researchers are interested in answering different questions about the 
relationship(s) between genes, behaviors, and development, and they use 
different methodologies to answer their questions.  The same diversity holds for 
human behavioral genetics: different researchers are interested in different 
questions, and in attempting to answer those questions they use different 
approaches. 
At the broadest level, one can distinguish between (1) research into the 
differences in behaviors between different individuals and (2) research into 
behaviors shared by (most) individuals.  It is obvious that some traits vary 
between people.  Different people tend to act differently—when, for example, 
someone is said to be shy, it follows that, in general, they act differently at 
parties than people who are said to be gregarious.  It is equally obvious that 
some traits do not vary much between people—although different people may 
speak different languages, all normal human adults (unlike other animals) use 
some complex language and learn that language while growing up. 
Researchers interested in the differences within a population will focus on 
the variation within that population.  For example, within normal human 
populations, some people are taller than others, some people score higher on 
standardized intelligence tests than others, and some are more prone to violent 
behavior than others.  Researchers interested in such differences attempt to 
discover how these differences are associated with the presence or absence of 
particular genes or environments.  In other words, are particular genes 
associated with being more (rather than less) prone to violence?  Do particular 
environments in which children grow up result in their being more (rather than 
less) likely to score highly on intelligence quotient (IQ) tests? 
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More generally, such research focuses on particular differences in the 
resources used in organismal development.  Humans, for example, develop over 
time from a single fertilized egg to an adult capable of a variety of complex 
behaviors, behaviors that require a body consisting of an astonishingly complex 
organization of many different types of cells.  The development of any complex 
organism requires a variety of resources.  Some of these resources are genetic 
(the genetic material inherited from the parents), some are environmental 
(from the prenatal environment of the mother, to the provision of food, and so 
forth), and some are hard to classify (the complex subcellular systems that, in 
conjunction with genes, make proteins, etc.).  The outcome of this development 
is a complex organism that differs from (and, of course, resembles) other 
organisms in the population in a variety of ways.  The goal of research focused 
on differences is to find ways to associate different phenotypes with differences 
in how the organisms developed—whether different phenotypes had, for 
example, different genes or experienced different environments.1  In these 
projects, the hope is that researchers will be able to explain how differences in 
available resources produce different outcomes. 
More specifically, human behavioral genetics research that is focused on 
variation in human behavioral tendencies tries to associate different behavioral 
tendencies with genetic differences.  It asks, for instance, if people who are 
more prone to violent behavior are also more likely to have certain genes, or if 
people who tend to score highly on standardized intelligence tests also share 
particular genetic traits. 
On the other hand, researchers interested in behaviors that do not vary 
significantly within a population have other goals.  In the study of behaviors 
shared by (most) humans, the purpose is to figure out how particular traits are 
produced in normal development.  For instance, all normally developing 
humans acquire the ability to use language, despite growing up in different 
 
 1. It is traditional in genetics research to distinguish between an organism’s genotype and its 
phenotype.  The genotype of an organism is the complete complement of genetic material—all of its 
DNA.  DNA consists of a deoxyribose sugar and phosphate “backbone” linked to nitrogen-based 
bases.  These bases, adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T) are the nucleotides, and 
each location on a DNA molecule where one of these bases can occur is a nucleotide site.  Particular 
stretches of DNA are called nucleotide regions, which are simply a “mapping” convenience and which 
can be entirely arbitrary.  Genes, on the other hand, are generally thought to be functional nucleotide 
regions (but see Box 1, infra, at 51).  The most obvious functional regions are those that code for 
proteins; nucleotide triplets (three base-pairs) or codons can specify which of twenty amino acids gets 
used in forming a protein.  It is these proteins, consisting of many amino acids, that are used in the 
cellular processes resulting in growth, reproduction, development, and the like. Famously, DNA forms 
a double-helix; these helixes themselves are wrapped tightly, and form chromosomes, each of which is a 
linear arrangement of the DNA. 
An organism’s phenotype consists of all the measurable traits of the organism except its DNA 
sequence.  So while, for example, the height of a plant is an aspect of its phenotype, so would be the 
concentration of a particular protein in a particular leaf of that plant.  As with most distinctions in 
biology, there are fuzzy areas—for example, the way a particular chromosome is folded can influence 
which genes are expressed, what proteins get made, and so forth; is this folding pattern an aspect of the 
organism’s genotype or phenotype?  Most researchers would consider them phenotypic, though they 
are not obviously so. 
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environments and having a different complement of genes.  What makes this 
possible?  How is our ability to use language produced in the process of normal 
human development?  The goal of these studies is to discover the particular 
developmental pathways—the biological systems that direct development—that 
transform developmental resources (genes, environments, etc.) into (nearly) 
universal outcomes, even though only some resources are shared universally. 
Researchers interested in understanding either the causes of variation in 
human behaviors or how human behaviors develop are at a disadvantage 
compared to researchers interested in answering similar questions associated 
with nonhuman organisms.  First, ethical restrictions on human experimentation 
make many kinds of experiments that are standard in other model organisms 
impossible to perform on humans.  Second, compared to traditional model 
organisms used in the study of behavior (nematode worms, fruit-flies, mice, 
etc.), human development is a very slow process.  The average human lifespan 
is very much longer, the behavioral repertoire of humans is larger, and the 
individual behaviors of interest are often more complex than those of other 
model organisms.  Despite these disadvantages, there have been active research 
programs in human behavioral genetics for the past century, and although 
progress in human behavioral genetics has been uneven, the field has advanced 
remarkably, given the difficulties inherent in such research.  Indeed, human 
behavioral genetics research programs have been quick to take advantage of the 
advances in molecular biology and human genetics more generally. 
This piece will explore some of the limits of human behavioral genetics 
research, focusing especially on how these limits affect the reasonableness of 
the interpretations and uses of the research results.  Despite enormous 
improvements in the techniques used by human behavioral genetics research, 
especially over the past decade, it is still too easy to mis- or overinterpret the 
results of particular research projects.  As the power and reliability of the tools 
used by researchers increases, it is especially important to keep in mind the 
conceptual limitations of the methodologies employed in human behavioral 
genetics research.  Even when the technical results themselves are impeccable 
(itself a rarely achieved feat, given the methodological difficulties with carrying 
out human genetics research of any sort), one must be very careful when 
interpreting—and especially when using—those results.  This is particularly true 
in areas where the results might be (mis)interpreted as having public policy or 
other social implications.  Studies of the relationship between human behavioral 
genetics and the criminal law provide ample room for such dangerous mis- and 
overinterpretations.  Given the focus of this current volume, then, there are 
good reasons to be particularly alert to the possibility of such misleading (and 
mistaken) interpretations. 
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II 
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY AND THE INTERACTIONIST CONSENSUS 
To fully understand the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of the various 
research techniques and the particular difficulties with adapting these 
techniques to studies of human behavioral genetics, one must first be familiar 
with what has become known as the interactionist consensus.2  According to the 
interactionist consensus, organisms and all their traits are the products of 
development processes that involve the interaction of genetic and 
environmental resources at every stage.  Hence, every trait of an organism is the 
result of the interaction of various genes and environments during the 
developmental process.  In order to be successful, organismal development 
always requires the presence and coordinated actions of various kinds of 
resources (genetic, epigenetic, and environmental, to name a few), so it makes 
no sense to ask if a particular trait is genetic or environmental in origin.  
Understanding how a trait develops is not a matter of finding out whether a 
particular gene or a particular environment causes the trait; rather, it is a matter 
of understanding how the various resources available in the production of the 
trait interact over time. 
However, too many references to the interactionist consensus fail to 
address, or even to suggest, the complexity of those interactions between genes 
and environments.  The very possibility of the development of any given trait 
requires the coordinated actions of both many genes and many aspects of the 
developmental environment.  For example, the production of a working human 
hand is contingent on the development of a more or less normal human body, 
which itself requires a vast array of genes and many environmental resources 
(proper food, shelter, and such). 
Indeed, when it comes to the interaction of genes and environments, it is 
often not even particularly clear what a gene is.  The same stretch of DNA (the 
same nucleotide region) can be involved in the production of many different 
proteins (through various forms of alternative splicing), and this can occur at 
different times and in different amounts (via regulatory genes).3  Furthermore, 
proteins coded by different genes can interact to form different proteins 
(physical epistasis) or can merely complement or impede the action of one 
another (statistical epistasis).4 
Similarly, references to the developmental environment tend to downplay 
the complexities and ambiguities inherent in this concept.  Developmental 
environments include not only external environmental factors (such as food, 
shelter, and parental care), but also the cellular structures and organization that 
 
 2. See generally Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths & Russell D. Gray, Introduction: What Is 
Developmental Systems Theory?, in CYCLES OF CONTINGENCY 1 (Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, & 
Russell D. Gray eds., 2001) (providing a brief history and discussion of the concept). 
 3. For a very brief review of DNA and “genes,” see supra note 1. 
 4. See Box 1. 
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make coordinated protein synthesis possible.  For example, the formation of 
new membranes (a necessary step for cellular reproduction, and hence for life 
as we know it) is impossible without pre-existing template membranes; changes 
in the membranes used as templates have been implicated in important 
speciation events.5  Hence, the entire environment makes possible the 
development of all the traits that make up the organism’s phenotype, and 
variations in either external environmental factors or cellular structures can 
influence development in any number of complex ways. 
Essentially, many factors contribute to developmental environments; they 
can be inherited from the organisms’ ancestors, found in the world, or 
constructed by the organisms themselves.6  Development is emphatically not 
merely a matter of genes providing the heritable instructions and the 
environment providing the raw materials.  Although such an image remains 
popular, it is deeply misleading and empirically inadequate.  Even though, in a 
sense, the interactionist consensus itself perpetuates this image by artificially 
dichotomizing the resources involved in development into genes and everything 
else, it is better to keep clearly in mind that genes (or, more precisely, 
nucleotide regions) are simply one developmental resource among many. 
 
Box 1.  Genes and Gene Expression 
 
In the classic gene concept, a gene codes for one protein.  Structurally, each 
gene is a string of nucleotides identifiable by a triplet of bases that form a start 
codon and another that forms a stop codon.7  However, contemporary genomic 
research has painted a very different picture of the relationship between the 
physical triplets of base-pairs and the proteins that are produced; the one gene–
one protein picture is no longer even remotely viable.  Some ways in which the 
current picture is more complex are the following roles for various genes:8 
(1) Regulatory Genes.  Regulatory genes include sequences of nucleotides 
that, by binding particular proteins, result in other genes being made 
more or less active.  So-called promoter regions enhance the protein 
production associated with other genes, whereas so-called silencer 
regions act to suppress the production of proteins associated with other 
genes. 
 
 5. EVA JABLONKA & MARION J. LAMB, EVOLUTION IN FOUR DIMENSIONS: GENETIC, 
EPIGENETIC, BEHAVIORAL, AND SYMBOLIC VARIATION IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE 121 (2005). 
 6. See generally LENNY MOSS, WHAT GENES CAN’T DO 75–117 (2003); F. JOHN ODLING-SMEE, 
KEVIN N. LALAND & MARCUS W. FELDMAN, NICHE CONSTRUCTION: THE NEGLECTED PROCESS IN 
EVOLUTION (2003); SUSAN OYAMA, THE ONTOGENY OF INFORMATION: DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS 
AND EVOLUTION (2d ed. 2000). 
 7. See Karola C. Stotz, Adam Bostanci & Paul Griffiths, Tracking the Shift to Post-Genomics, 9 
COMMUNITY GENETICS (forthcoming Spring 2006), available at http://www.pitt.edu/~kstotz/genes/ 
Stotz_Bostanci.pdf. 
 8. See id. at 6–9; Karola Stotz, Paul E. Griffiths & Rob D. Knight, How Biologists Conceptualize 
Genes: An Empirical Study, 35 STUD. HIST. PHIL. BIOL. & BIOMED. SCI. 647, 649–54 (2004). 
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(2) Frame Shifting.  In frame shifting, one continuous stretch of DNA is 
involved in the production of two (or more) different proteins as the 
two different messenger-RNA (mRNA) strands are produced from 
overlapping parts of that stretch of DNA. 
(3) Overlapping Genes.  In the case of so-called overlapping genes, one 
continuous stretch of DNA is involved in the production of two (or 
more9) different proteins as the different mRNA strands are produced, 
each from parts of the DNA stretch. 
(4) Trans-splicing.  In trans-splicing, two (or more) discontinuous stretches 
of DNA are involved in the production of two (or more) separate pre-
mRNA strands that then combine to form a single mature RNA strand.  
The stretches involved in trans-splicing may also be involved in the 
production of other mRNA strands, and hence other proteins. 
(5) Physical Epistasis.  In the case of physical epistasis, two (or more) 
discontinuous stretches of DNA are involved in the production of two 
(or more) separate mRNA strands and two (or more) different proteins 
that then interact to form a third protein, which has a developmental 
function different from that of either of the two proteins that interact to 
form it. 
Gene action can also be influenced by such heritable epigenetic mechanisms as 
the following: 
(6) DNA-methylization.  Methyl groups are attached to the DNA strand, 
influencing the activation of gene transcription.  These attachments can 
be reliably inherited through non-genetic pathways, primarily via 
physical imprinting. 
(7) Chromatin condensation.  The shapes into which chromosomes fold 
influence which genes will be most easily accessed and transcribed.  
Variation in chromatin condensation patterns is heritable by non-
genetic pathways—again, primarily by physical imprinting. 
A sense of the complexity of the interactionist element of the interactionist 
consensus is apparent in a brief summary of behavioral genetics research on the 
nematode worm C. elegans by Kenneth F. Schaffner, listing eight rules 
governing the relationship between the worm’s genes and behaviors.10  These 
rules include the expectation that 
(1) any given gene will affect many different behaviors, in part by affecting 
many different neurons (pleiotropy—one gene affects many traits); 
(2) any given neuron will be affected by many different genes (statistical 
epistatis—each trait is affected by many genes); 
 
 9. Documented cases of nineteen—and more—exist! 
 10. Kenneth F. Schaffner, Genetic Explanations of Behavior: Of Worms, Flies, and Men, in 
GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: METHODS, MEANINGS, AND MORALS 88–90 (David 
Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit eds., 2001).  Shaffner is a researcher involved in the conceptual bases 
of behavioral genetics. 
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(3) different genes will interact in complex ways to affect the development 
of particular neuron(s) (physical epistatsis—gene products interact to 
form new proteins); 
(4) any given behavior will involve many different neurons; 
(5) any particular neuron will be involved in multiple behaviors; 
(6) different developmental environments will result in different behaviors 
in genetically identical organisms (phenotypic plasticity); 
(7) development is stochastic—genetically identical organisms raised in 
seemingly identical environments will express different behaviors via 
different neuron formation (caused by developmental noise and unique 
environmental influences); and, finally, 
(8) gene expression depends on (often heritable) epigenetic factors, such 
that the local developmental environment of the gene(s) in question can 
be expected to influence behavior. 
Given the relative simplicity of the C. elegans nervous system and of the 
behaviors studied, Schaffner argues that these rules should be regarded as the 
default assumptions for the study of the behavioral genetics of any multicellular 
organism.11  There might be cases in which the particular organism is simpler 
than these assumptions imply, but these will likely be very rare.  Usually, the 
developmental pathways between genes, developmental environments, and 
behaviors will demonstrate at least the level of complexity these rules suggest. 
 
Box 2.  C. Elegans—the Reductionist’s Delight 
 
The nematode C. elegans has been a staple of developmental biology 
research since the 1960s, in large part because of its relative simplicity and its 
straightforward developmental progress (in addition to the advantage of its 
being mostly transparent, a boon for researchers wishing to keep track of which 
cells end up where).12  Indeed, studying its development in a stepwise fashion 
seems so straightforward that Robert Cook-Deegan has referred to it as “the 
reductionist’s delight.”13 
C. elegans has two forms—a hermaphrodite and a male form.  The adult 
hermaphrodite has 959 somatic cells; of these, 302 are neurons, making its 
nervous system by far its largest organ.14  The male is far less common in the 
wild, and it has slightly more somatic cells (1031); of these, 381 are neurons.15 
In many ways, the development of C. elegans is very well understood.  For 
example, it is known how each cell in C. elegans arrives at its final location in 
the organism, including which cells suffer programmed cell death as C. elegans 
 
 11. See Box 2.  Shaffner, supra note 10, at 89–91. 
 12. Shaffner, supra note 10, at 85–86. 
 13. ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, GENE WARS 53 (1994). 
 14. C. elegans has ninety-five muscle cells, the second largest system. 
 15. See, e.g., THE NEMATODE CAENORHABDITIS ELEGANS (William B. Wood ed., 1988). 
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grows.  It is even possible to produce a wiring diagram that shows how the 
synapses connect the neurons to each other and to the somatic cells. 
C. elegans has a relatively small genome (about 97 million base-pairs), and a 
number of C. elegans genomes have been sequenced.16 Although researchers 
have begun to understand how different genes and different environments 
influence the behavioral repertoire of C. elegans, they have not yet, despite 
extensive effort, determined all the genes and developmental pathways 
involved in, for example, the mating behavior of C. elegans.17  Even though that 
mating behavior (involving four separate steps) is considered quite complex, it 
is of course vastly simpler than most human behaviors of interest to researchers 
involved in human behavioral genetics. 
Such complexities highlight the difference between research that attempts to 
understand the development of traits that are widely shared within a population 
of organisms and research that attempts to find associations among differences 
in such traits.  C. elegans researchers focus on how worms develop shared traits.  
For instance, in studying the worms’ ability to exhibit mating behavior, they 
seek to identify the genes used in producing certain physical traits and to 
investigate to role of different aspects of the environment.  This kind of work 
permits them to explain, in some detail, how a particular behavior is 
produced—what physically causes that behavior and how the structures 
necessary for that kind of behavior come to exist in a particular worm.  This 
kind of research requires techniques different from those used in research 
focused on differences between individuals.  Research focused on differences 
can, for the most part, ignore any environmental or genetic resources that are 
shared by all members of a population.  If there is no variation in a resource, 
then there can be no variation in traits associated with differences in that 
resource.18 
For behavioral genetics research that attempts to understand the causes of 
individual variation in particular human behaviors, it is appropriate to focus on 
differences in particular developmental resources (genes and environments, for 
example) that are causally associated with the behavioral variation.  For 
instance, when studying why some people are more prone to violence than 
others, it may be appropriate to study variation in their home lives—for 
example, whether they were abused as children.  However, this is not the same 
task as determining which resources are involved in the development of the 
trait more generally.  Again, if resources do not vary within the population, they 
will not be identified by research programs attempting to explain individual 
variation in a trait, even if those resources are of fundamental importance to the 
 
 16. A variety of C. elegans genomes are available for download from http://www.wormbase.org. 
 17. See Caenorhabditis Elegans WWW Server, http://elegans.swmed.edu/ (last visited Sept. 25, 
2005) (providing recent C. elegans papers, research, and the like). 
 18. See generally Robert Plomin, John C. DeFries, Ian W. Craig & Peter McGuffin, Behavioral 
Genetics, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS IN THE POSTGENOMIC ERA 531–40 (Robert Plomin et al., eds., 
2003) (outlining how this distinction is used in behavioral genetics more generally). 
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proper development of the trait.  On the other hand, research that attempts to 
understand the development of behaviors more generally, including behaviors 
that are (essentially) universal in the populations in question, will tend to focus 
on all the different kinds of resources used in producing traits, including all the 
developmental pathways that produce organisms capable of those kinds of 
behaviors and that result in those sorts of behaviors being expressed. 
III 
TECHNOLOGIES AND TECHNIQUES: RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES AND (SOME 
OF) THE LIMITS OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 
Since its inception, human behavioral genetics has pursued research into the 
possible biological bases of violence and criminality.19  Although in recent years 
this research has often been seen as politically and socially controversial,20 
various research programs have continued to generate results receiving 
extensive attention in both scientific journals and the popular press.  The 
following discussion introduces some of these contemporary research programs 
into the possible biological bases of violence and criminality21 as examples of 
research techniques pursued by human behavioral genetics research programs. 
This discussion will highlight two fundamentally different problems: first, 
the empirical difficulties facing these research programs, and, second, the 
conceptual limitations of the techniques these programs use.  The first problem 
is fundamentally practical in nature.  Some of the research techniques currently 
used in behavioral genetics research are generally very difficult to adapt to 
human behavioral genetics.  Studies that attempt to do so produce results that 
are often less reliable than one might wish.  Though these are empirical 
problems, some of them are likely unsolvable, for example because ethical 
restrictions on human experimentation make certain kinds of information 
regarding human development very likely unobtainable.  On the other hand, 
the second problem is conceptual in nature.  For some techniques, critiquing the 
reliability of the data obtained is less important than understanding the limits of 
the data’s legitimate uses and interpretations.  In these cases, the techniques in 
question, even if applied perfectly, answer very specific questions in very 
specific domains.  As such, the results of these studies cannot simply be 
extended to other domains, nor can they be used to answer other kinds of 
questions. 
 
 19. See, e.g., DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF 
HUMAN HEREDITY (1985). 
 20. See, e.g., Natalie Angier, Disputed Meeting to Ask if Crime Has Genetic Roots, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 1995, at C1; Natalie Angier, At Conference on Links of Violence to Heredity: A Calm After the 
Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at C8. 
 21. See also Laura A. Baker, Serena Bezdjian & Adrian Raine, Behavioral Genetics: The Science of 
Antisocial Behavior, in 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Winter/Spring 2006). 
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A. Statistical Analysis of Variance: Heritability, Plasticity, and All That. . . 
1. What is Heritability and How is it Measured? 
Heritability is perhaps the most controversial concept in human genetics 
research, especially in human behavioral genetics.  Over at least the past three 
decades, various authors have criticized both the techniques used to generate 
estimates of heritability in human populations and the interpretations and uses 
of these estimates.  This is especially true for behavioral traits.22  However, since 
researchers in human behavioral genetics, including those working on biological 
associations with variation in violence and criminality, continue to cite 
heritability estimates relatively often,23 it is worth briefly covering some of the 
traditional difficulties inherent in the concept. 
Heritability is usually interpreted as a measure of the proportion of the 
variance in a particular trait in a particular population that is associated with 
genetic variation in that population.24  Put more simply, heritability is a measure 
of the extent to which related individuals in a population resemble each other 
more than they resemble unrelated individuals.  It can be thought of roughly as 
a measure of how much children can be expected to resemble their parents 
more then they resemble the average member of the population.  Heritability is, 
then, appropriate only for research programs interested in understanding the 
causes of differences between individuals within a population.  Heritability will 
be undefined for any trait that is shared by all organisms within a population, 
 
 22. The classic critical article is Richard Lewontin, The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of 
Causes, 26 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 400 (1974).  See also Elliot Sober, Separating Nature from 
Nurture, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: METHODS, MEANINGS, AND MORALS, supra note 
10, at 47. 
 23. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 21, at 25 (citing a broad-sense heritability estimate of 0.41 for 
antisocial behavior); see also S. H. Rhee & I. D. Waldman, Genetic and Environmental Influences on 
Antisocial Behavior: a Meta-analysis of Twin and Adoption Studies, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 490, 490–529 
(2002) (providing a meta-analysis of over 50 studies on the heritability of criminality). 
 24. See Lewontin, supra note 22, at 402–09; Baker et al., supra note 21.  This refers more 
particularly to broad-sense heritability.  Briefly,  if  the total amount of phenotypic variation in a 
particular trait in a particular population is given by the total variance in that trait, VP (roughly, the 
average deviation in that population from the mean value of that trait within the population), then that 
variation can be partitioned out as follows: 
VP = VG + VE +  VGxE + e  (Equation 1) 
where VG is that portion of the variation from the mean phenotypic value in the population associated 
with genetic variation in that population, VE is the portion of the variation from the mean phenotypic 
value associated with environmental variation, VGxE is the portion of the variation from the mean 
phenotypic value associated with gene-by-environment interactions (associated with genetic and 
environmental variations other than the additive effects of VG and VE), and e is everything else (in 
practice this includes unique environmental effects, developmental noise, and measurement errors).  
Broad-sense heritability, the portion of phenotypic variation association associated with genetic 
variation, is therefore expressed as 
H2 = VG / VP   (Equation 2) 
Broad-sense heritability includes both additive and nonadditive genetic effects, whereas narrow-sense 
heritability includes only additive effects.  Narrow-sense heritability is important in plant and animal 
breeding, as it provides a measure of likely response to short-term selection; it is not, however, of any 
particular use in human behavioral genetics. 
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because all the organisms in the population resemble each other equally with 
respect to that trait.  If there is no variation in the trait, then neither genes nor 
environments can be associated with that variation. 
It follows that heritability cannot be properly thought of as a measure of the 
extent to which genes are involved in the development of a particular trait.  
Rather, the development of a trait can involve the actions of many genes that 
are all critical for that trait’s formation.  But if those genes are shared by all 
organisms in the population, the trait, if it varies at all in the population, may 
still have a heritability of zero, since, because those genes do not vary, none of 
the variation in the trait is associated with genetic variation. 
Accurately determining the heritability of a trait generally requires being 
able to sort organisms with known genotypes from a given population into 
known environments and to follow them throughout their development.  In 
nonhuman animals, this is usually done through controlled breeding 
experiments in which organisms with known particular genotypes are physically 
sorted into the particular environments in which they are raised.  But this only 
gives an estimate of heritability in the environments actually tested and for the 
population actually used.  Accurately finding the broad-sense heritability of a 
trait in natural populations, where the organisms in question are not 
deliberately sorted into particular environments, is quite difficult; in the case of 
humans, it is all but impossible.  That is, generating reliable estimates of 
heritability in humans through the sort of controlled breeding experiments done 
to generate estimates of heritability in nonhuman animals is not possible; it is 
possible, however, to generate rather inaccurate and less reliable estimates 
through other methods.  These methods aim to separate out shared genetic 
variation from shared environmental variation.  However, since children 
growing up in families usually share with each other and their parents aspects of 
both their environment and of their genes, teasing apart any associations these 
different aspects might have to variation in phenotypes is tricky. 
Estimates of the heritability of traits in humans are generated from studying 
situations in which it is thought possible to separate the influences of shared 
environments from the influences of shared genes.  These situations include 
adoption studies, monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twin studies, and 
studies about monozygotic twins reared apart.25 
In adoption studies, the shared variation in the phenotype of interest in 
siblings adopted into separate families is compared to the shared variation in 
siblings raised together, as well as between those groups and unrelated 
individuals adopted into the same and different families.  The assumption is that 
those siblings adopted into separate families will resemble each other more than 
they resemble the population at large only insofar as they share similar genes; 
on the other hand, those siblings raised together in the same family will share 
 
 25. See, e.g., ROBERT PLOMIN, JOHN C. DEFRIED, GERALD E. MCCLERN & PETER MCGUFFIN, 
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS (4th ed. 2001) (discussing adoption studies and providing numerous 
examples). 
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both genetic and the environmental components, and unrelated individuals 
adopted into the same families will share only the environmental components. 
The assumption in monozygotic and dizygotic twin studies is that both 
mono- and dizygotic twins share (roughly) the same environmental influences 
(since they are raised in the same home), and hence any difference in the 
degree to which MZ and DZ twins resemble each other more than they do the 
population at large can be attributed to different amounts of shared genetic 
resemblance.26 
If monozygotic twins are separated at birth (or, better yet, at conception, to 
avoid the shared gestational environment) and reared in uncorrelated 
environments, the heritability of the trait in question can be determined simply 
by the degree to which the twins resemble each other more than they resemble 
the population at large.  Insofar as studies of monozygotic twins reared apart 
thus resemble each other more than others to a greater or lesser degree, the 
heritability of the trait of interest can be estimated. 
 None of these methods of study is ideal or, in practice, even very good. 
There are too many confounding factors, and it is too difficult to separate 
shared environmental influences from shared genetic similarities in humans.27  
But the accuracy of the heritability estimates of human behaviors emerging 
from these studies is really not the issue. 
 Heritability estimates, no matter how accurate, are of very limited use.  
Heritability estimates have been published for such human psychological traits 
as antisocial behavior and such particular behaviors as criminality and violence.  
Estimates of the heritability of antisocial behaviors (construed broadly) are 
usually said to cluster around 0.5, with only a relatively small number of studies 
reporting much lower or higher estimates.28  This means that roughly half the 
observed variation in antisocial behavior is associated with the genetic variation 
present in the tested societies, rather than, say, environmental variation or 
other effects.  Studies of violent behaviors (construed somewhat narrowly) have 
been less consistent, with reported estimates ranging from no discernable 
heritability up to around 0.5.29  It is not surprising that different studies generate 
very different heritability estimates, even when they are supposed to be 
measuring the same behaviors or traits.  This is because estimates of heritability 
can easily vary with the particular methods used (for instance, MZ/DZ versus 
adoption studies), the particular way that the trait in question is 
operationalized, and the particular population tested. 
 
 26. Monozygotic twins share all of their DNA, whereas dizygotic twins share only half their DNA 
(the same amount as “ordinary” siblings). 
 27. See Sober, supra note 22, at 55–62. 
 28. See, e.g., Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Antisocial Behavior, in GENETICS AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR: THE ETHICAL CONTEXT 72–96 (2002), available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/ 
fileLibrary/pdf/nuffieldgeneticsrep.pdf; Baker et al., supra note 21. 
 29. See, e.g., Nuffield Council on Bioethics, supra note 28, at 87–96; Baker et al., supra note 21. 
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However, as has often been stressed in the literature, the problem is not the 
difficulty of generating accurate estimates of heritability in human populations; 
rather, the problem is due to the locality of the measure itself and the extent to 
which estimates of heritability are uninformative with respect to the causal 
pathways involved.30  These two problems are briefly addressed below. 
2. The Locality of Heritability 
A trait that is highly heritable in one environment may have a very low 
heritability in another environment.  For example, the heritability of adult 
human hair color is rather high in cultures with no tradition of dyeing hair, but 
it is likely much lower in cultures with such a tradition.  Less trivially, in 
populations in which individuals have radically different access to adequate 
food, such environmental differences may be strongly associated with adult 
height, so the heritability of height may be reduced; in cultures in which 
adequate access to food is more common, the role of that environmental 
difference will be reduced, and genetic differences will be more strongly 
associated with height variation.  Heritability estimates, then, are local—the 
heritability of a trait can vary with variations in the environment or with the 
makeup of the population.  One classic approach to making the locality of 
heritability perspicuous is to consider the genotype’s norm of reaction for a 
particular trait, given the possible developmental environments of interest—
that is, to consider what the resulting phenotype will be, given a particular 
genotype and a particular developmental environment.31  Dobzhansky, one of 
the founders of modern genetics, claimed that although it was incorrect to think 
of an organism’s genotype as determining its phenotype, it was correct to think 
of the genotype as determining the “reaction norm” of the phenotype.32 
Of course, Dobzhansky was quick to note that the complete reaction norm 
of a genotype could never be completely known, since that would require 
knowing how the particular organism would develop in every possible 
combination of environments.33  Partial norms of reaction represent how one 
trait varies when some aspect of the environment is varied.  They are 
incomplete in that they fail to account for how variation in other aspects of the 
environment might affect the trait.  Even so, partial norms of reaction remain a 
good way to understand phenotypic plasticity—that is, the differences in 
phenotype that emerge in different environments, even in organisms with the 
same genotypes.  A phenotypic trait is plastic insofar as it varies with variation 
in the developmental environment of the organism.  For example, in humans, 
the number of limbs is generally nonplastic (most developmental environments 
result in people having the same number of limbs), whereas the specific 
 
 30. Lewontin, supra note 22.  See also Sober, supra note 22, at 47. 
 31. Lewontin, supra note 22.  See also Sober, supra note 22, at 47. 
 32. THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY, EVOLUTION, GENETICS, AND MAN 74–75 (1955). 
 33. Id. 
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language spoken is highly plastic (whether one speaks French or English, for 
example, depends almost entirely on the language heard during development). 
Technically, generating even partial norms of reaction requires raising 
genetically identical organisms in a particular set of environments.  In practice, 
when a group of organisms is thought to possess a particular, similar genotype 
(by virtue, say, of their having adapted to a particular local condition), the norm 
of reaction is often associated with organisms with that sort of genotype, rather 
than with being the genotype’s norm of reaction per se.34  This is exemplified in 
Cooper and Zubek’s work on rats bred to be either particularly good at running 
mazes (maze-bright), or particularly bad at running mazes (maze-dull).35  
Cooper and Zubek started with rats that were either maze-bright or maze-dull 
when raised under normal laboratory conditions.  However, when reared in 
enriched environments, such as laboratory cages with lots of toys, the maze-dull 
rats improved immensely, while the maze-bright rats did not get much better: in 
the enriched environment, the two lines of rats performed similarly well.  On 
the other hand, when raised in impoverished environments (in gray cages with 
no mobile objects), the maze-dull rats did not get much worse, but the 
performance of the maze-bright rats suffered enormously; under these 
conditions, the two lines of rats performed similarly poorly.  Graphed, these 
three performances under each of the three environments can be thought of as 
a partial, or generalized, norm of reaction.36 

















 34. These have been called “generalized” norms of reaction. See, e.g., Sahotra Sarkar & Trevon 
Fuller, Generalized Norms of Reaction for Ecological Developmental Biology, 5 EVOLUTION & DEV. 
106 (2003). 
 35. R.M. Cooper & John P. Zubek, Effects of Enriched and Restricted Early Environments on the 
Learning Ability of Rats, 12 CANADIAN J. PSYCHOL. 159 (1958). 
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Caption, Figure 1: This partial norm of reaction shows the different ways in which two 
different kinds of genotypes respond to three different developmental environments.  
Rats bred under normal laboratory conditions to be either very good or very bad at 
running mazes show a significant difference in maze-running ability when raised in 
those normal conditions.  However, when raised in an impoverished environment, the 
difference in the ability of the maze-bright rats compared to that of the maze-dull rats 
is not statistically significant.  When raised in an enriched environment, again, there is 
no statistically significant difference in the maze-running abilities of the two strains.  
Although the maze-dull rats show marked improvement between normal and enriched 
environments, the maze-bright rats show no such improvement.  Similarly, while 
maze-bright rats do show a marked improvement between the impoverished and the 
normal environments, the performance of maze-dull rats is unchanged. 
The maze-running ability of these rats show significant plasticity with respect 
to the environment in which they are raised; neither kind of rat performed 
equally well in all the environments.  Further, the two populations display 
plasticity under different environmental conditions.  The maze-dull rats show 
little plasticity in performance between impoverished and normal 
environments, whereas the maze-bright rats show significant plasticity in that 
range.  The maze-dull rats, however, show significant plasticity in performance 
between the normal and the enriched environments, whereas the performance 
of the maze-bright rats is unaffected by that variation.  In all three 
environments the rats’ behavior displays a strong gene-by-environment 
interaction effect.  That is, variation in the performance of the rats cannot be 
accounted for by simply adding the overall effects of the environmental 
variation and the overall effects of the genetic variation.  Rather, different 
genotypes interact differently with the various available environments. 
So what is the heritability of maze-running ability in these rats?  The 
question simply cannot be answered without more information—in fact, the 
question does not make sense unless one knows the environments and structure 
of the two rat populations.  If one looked only at the normal laboratory 
environment, the heritability of maze-running ability would be quite high; most 
of the variation in maze-running ability would be associated with the genetic 
differences between the two kinds of rats in the population.  However, if one 
looked only at the impoverished and enriched environments, the heritability of 
maze-running ability would be quite low (essentially zero), since most of the 
variation in maze-running performance would be associated with the different 
environments in which the rats were reared; there would be no statistically 
significant difference in ability associated with the genetic differences in the two 
strains of rats.  Given a particular population of rats, with particular numbers of 
maze-bright and maze-dull rats distributed in a particular way in the 
developmental environments, heritability could of course be calculated, but that 
number would hold only for that particular population.  If one changed the 
distribution of rats in the environments, one would likely change the heritability 
of maze-running ability as well.  It may be difficult or impossible to perform 
similar studies on humans, but this generalization still holds true: just because a 
trait (say, anti-social behavior) has a particular heritability in a particular 
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population at a particular time, this does not necessarily mean it will have a 
similar heritability in other environments or in other populations. 
Heritability, then, is emphatically not a measure of the degree to which a 
particular trait is genetically determined.  A trait can have a heritability of one 
hundred percent in one developmental environment, but a heritability of zero 
percent in another.  The heritability of a trait can be one hundred percent in 
each of two populations, but its average difference in each population can be 
due entirely to environmental factors.37  And the development of a trait can 
critically involve any number of genes, yet the trait itself can have a heritability 
of zero.38 
 
Box 3: Heritability, Locality, and Genetic Determinism 
 
I. A trait can have a heritability of one hundred percent in one 
environment, yet a heritability of zero in another environment.  In the 
case of Cooper and Zubek’s rats, the heritability of maze-running 
ability in the normal environment would be quite high; however, in the 
impoverished and enriched environments, it would be zero. 
II. The heritability of a trait can be one hundred percent in each of two 
populations, but the difference in the mean value of the trait between 
the populations can be entirely environmental in origin.  Example: Two 
(genetically distinct) varieties of corn, type 1 and type 2, are planted in 
two different fields, A and B.  Each field is uniform with respect to 
water, nutrients, and so forth, but field A is fertilized better than B.  In 
each field, the differences in performance between type 1 and type 2 
corn will be due to the genetic differences, but the difference in 
performance between the fields may be due entirely to the different 
environmental treatments the two fields received. 
III. The development of a trait can critically involve any number of genes, 
yet the trait itself can have a heritability of zero.  Example: Normal 
limb development in humans involves the activity of a large number of 
different genes, yet the heritability of the number of legs in humans is 
essentially zero—almost all the variation in leg numbers in humans is 
associated with environmental causes (usually trauma), and not with 
genetic variation. 
3. Heritability and Alternative Causal Pathways 
Given the difficulty in sorting humans with particular genotypes into 
particular developmental environments, estimating the heritability of traits in 
humans is likewise hard.  Estimates of the heritability of particular human 
behavioral traits tend to vary widely between studies, but this is hardly 
 
 37. See, e.g., Lewontin, supra note 22. 
 38. See Box 3. 
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surprising, given the difficulties with estimating heritability in humans and the 
locality of heritability as a measure.  But the difficulties involved in human 
experimentation add an additional level of uncertainty to heritability estimates.  
In humans, even if the heritability of a trait is known, the causal pathways 
through which the trait’s heritability is expressed are very difficult to 
disentangle. 
For example, in the American population as a whole, African Americans 
score, on average, significantly lower on standardized IQ tests than do white 
Americans.39  Combined with the heritability of performance on IQ tests,40 these 
statistics have been interpreted by some to imply that genetic differences in the 
two populations are responsible for the difference in scores.41  Leaving aside for 
the moment the different environments experienced by each population and the 
impossibility of using heritability estimates to support a trait’s heritability when 
the two populations experience different environments,42 good reasons support 
assuming that the causal pathway is unclear.  Steele and Aronson, for example, 
demonstrate that African American students perform significantly worse when 
told they are taking an IQ test then when told they are taking a test unrelated to 
IQ; white American students do not perform significantly differently under 
these circumstances.43  Steele and Aronson attribute the underperformance of 
African students on IQ tests to “stereotype threat”—the threat that performing 
badly on an IQ test will reinforce a particular harmful stereotype—a worry that 
white students simply do not share.  Given that skin color is heritable and that 
these stereotypes do exist in our society, the performance differences in IQ tests 
will be heritable, but not because of any genetic difference causally related in 
any ordinary way to IQ test-taking skills.  Rather, these differences will be 
associated with a particular social environment—associating one’s race with 
particular stereotypes.  If that environment were changed, then the heritability 
of test performance would also change.  The lesson here is that even an accurate 
estimate of heritability can say little about the causal pathways involved in 
generating the variation in any one trait. 
Some researchers interpret these limitations to imply that finding the 
heritability of a trait is only a first step, which, ideally, should be followed with 
 
 39. See generally Ned Block, How Heritability Misleads About Race, 56 COGNITION 99 (1995) 
(arguing that authors frequently misinterpret the concept of heritability, leading to fallacious 
conclusions about race). 
 40. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, supra note 28, at 72 (reporting estimates ranging between 0.35 
and 0.75). 
 41. See, e.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE 
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994); Arthur R. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ 
and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARVARD EDUC. REV. 1 (1969); J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON, RACE, 
EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR (1999). 
 42. See Box 3, II, supra p. 62. 
 43. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Performance of 
African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995).  Indeed, merely being asked to 
indicate one’s race on the test form (by checking a box) lowered the average scores of black students, 
but had no effect on the average scores of white students. 
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studies into the mechanisms responsible for that trait’s development, focusing 
especially on those differences in the available developmental resources that 
make a difference in the development of the phenotype involved.  Thirty years 
ago, when the discovery that a particular trait in model organisms was heritable 
was sometimes the first step into studying the complexities of the 
developmental process, this line of argument was more plausible.  Now, 
however, researchers in model organisms tend to skip estimating heritability 
and move directly to approaches that attempt to identify nucleotide regions 
associated with the observed differences.  If researchers attempting to estimate 
the heritability of various behavioral traits in humans were more cautious and 
circumspect about the claims they made respecting their research results, this 
first-step characterization of the research would seem, if not convincing, at least 
harmless.  However, estimates of heritability get reported in ways that make 
interpreting them as full-blown causal accounts all too easy.  These estimates 
are then used in legal cases and in framing public policy issues without the 
appropriate cautions.44 
4. Heritability, Causation, and Changes 
Heritability, then, is a local measure—it can, and often does, change with 
changes in the environment or in the population more generally.  It must not be 
interpreted as a measure of the extent to which genes are involved in the 
development of a trait, nor should it be thought of as revealing the causal 
processes by which a trait is produced.  However, despite all that is known 
theoretically and empirically about the locality of heritability and about 
heritability’s inability to provide causal information, strong claims continue to 
be made regarding what knowing the heritability of a trait entitles one to say 
about, for example, the possibility of changing that trait, the causal genesis of 
that trait, and the social policies relevant to that trait that ought to be pursued.  
For example, Hamer and Copeland take the high heritability of performance on 
standard IQ tests to mean that “no other single factor is more important than 
genes in determining cognitive ability.”45  They claim that the very high 
heritability (“70 to 90 percent”) of very shy or inhibited personality types is 
“probably the reason such personalities do not change much during a 
lifetime.”46  The same kind of causal language appears when Kendler argues that 
the frequency of “stressful life events” encountered is “genetically influenced” 
through the high heritability of temperament, and that it is “because of 
differences in genetic constitution” that people “select themselves into high 
versus low risk environments.”47 
 
 44. See, e.g., JONATHAN M. KAPLAN, THE LIMITS AND LIES OF HUMAN GENETIC RESEARCH: 
DANGERS FOR SOCIAL POLICY (2000). 
 45. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES—WHY THEY MATTER MORE 
THAN YOU THINK 219 (1998). 
 46. Id. at 66–67. 
 47. Kenneth S. Kendler, Major Depression and the Environment, 31 PHARMOCOPSYCHIATRY 5, 7–
8 (1998). 
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Once such causal language is accepted, then applied to explain behavior, its 
use in support of social policy recommendations is rarely far behind.  
Infamously, Murray and Hernstein argue from the high heritability of IQ to 
conclusions regarding appropriate social policies.  Starting from the kinds of 
claims made by human behavior genetics researchers, they argue that in a 
society that sorts itself according to ability, some people are going to be stuck at 
the bottom because of genetically mediated, inherited differences in ability.  
Therefore, they conclude nothing much could, or should, be done about this; 
social programs aimed at helping the children of poor parents to achieve 
academic success are, in this view, a waste of money.48  In a slightly more 
cautious vein, DiLalla and Gottesman argue from the high heritability of “anti-
social behavior” (citing estimates of around 0.5) to the conclusion that 
understanding “intergenerational transmission” of violence and abusive 
behavior will require understanding the “genetic and biological factors” which 
“influence violent crime” and that “social policy decisions” formed without 
such an understanding will likely be “faulty.”49  Their conclusion implies that 
knowing the heritability of a trait can, and should, influence social policy. 
The same kind of reasoning has also been used in legal cases.  For example, 
Judge Parslow, deciding the famous custody battle of Johnson v. Calvert in 
California, cited the high heritability of IQ and other behavioral traits as a 
reason why genetic parenthood should determine custody.50  Because of the 
high heritability of these traits, the genetic parents of a child will resemble that 
child more than other individuals and will thus be in a better position to 
understand the child.  Interestingly, some authors have argued from the high 
heritability of IQ to the conclusion that a child’s best interests might not lie with 
giving custody to his or her genetic parents, since that child would probably fare 
about the same in life, whatever the environment.51  When the developmental 
environment is not strongly associated with variation in those traits, the parent’s 
identity just does not matter that much. 
In cases involving liability for lead poisoning, the high heritability of IQ has 
been used to justify testing the intelligence of parents and other relatives.52  The 
theory was, apparently, that if the parents are none too bright and if IQ is 
 
 48. See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 41, at 10 (“[B]ecause IQ is substantially heritable, 
because economic success in life depends in part on the talents measured by IQ tests, and because 
social standing depends in part on economic success, it follows that social standing is bound to be based 
to some extend on inherited differences.”); Jensen, supra note 41. 
 49. Lisabeth F. DiLalla & Irving I. Gottesman, Biological and Genetic Contributors to Violence—
Wisdom’s Untold Tale, 109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 125, 128 (1991). 
 50. Johnson v. Calvert, 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380–81 (Cal. 1993) (upholding the trial court’s decision 
to give custody to a child’s “natural” genetic mother rather than the child’s surrogate birth mother). 
 51. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Crazy Marking: Embryos and Gestational Mothers, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP.  Jan.–Feb. 1991, at 35, 37 (1991); Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
193 (1996); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE (2002) (offering a more contemporary spin on this 
idea). 
 52. See Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ Determination, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in 
Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1059–65 (1997). 
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heritable, then the lead probably was not at fault for the child’s cognitive 
problems, after all. 
But if one takes what is known about the locality of heritability estimates 
seriously, it is immediately obvious that none of these claims is supportable by 
heritability estimates, no matter how high or how accurate that estimate may 
be.  Hamer just gets it wrong when he writes that the high heritability of IQ 
implies that “no other single factor is more important than genes in determining 
cognitive ability.”53  The only supportable claim in this regard is far more 
cautious—namely, that within the developmental environments experienced 
with reasonably high frequency by the populations tested, the high heritability 
of IQ implies that genetic differences are more strongly associated with 
differences in the scores achieved on IQ tests than are other factors.  But this is 
not Hamer’s claim.  Differences in performance on IQ tests might be strongly 
associated with any number of environmental factors, but if these factors did 
not happen to vary in the populations tested, their influence would be missed by 
analyses of variance and hence would not appear in heritability estimates. 
Replacing language of association with more causal language would be 
misleading and indeed might mislead in socially dangerous ways.  Development 
of complex phenotypes (including the ability to engage in complex behaviors) is 
marked by systems of complex feedback between the different resources 
available to human development.  As such, a particular gene does not do the 
same thing throughout development, and the environment it encounters 
changes as the organism develops.  So, for example, the development of a 
complex behavior could easily be influenced by environmental differences that 
themselves emerged from the development of an entirely different and 
otherwise independent phenotype.  Thus the trait would show high heritability 
if the independent phenotype was heritable, but the heritability of the trait 
would be the result of the different environments encountered.  Under such 
circumstances, to say genes associated with the differences in the independent 
phenotype caused its differences would stretch the ordinary meaning of cause 
almost beyond recognition. 
In controlled breeding studies, these kinds of effects can usually be 
disentangled, but not through estimates of heritability.  Rather, what 
environmental factors might co-vary (that is, be systematically related to each 
other) and how particular environmental variations might co-vary (perhaps in 
complex ways) with genetic differences must be considered.  The experiments 
can then be repeated, eliminating the kinds of co-variation concerned.  In the 
case of Cooper and Zubek’s rats, for example, some researchers claimed that 
maze-bright and maze-dull rats did not differ in learning ability per se, but 
rather in curiosity.  Under normal conditions, the more curious rats performed 
better on maze-running tasks than the less curious rats, and hence they 
 
 53. HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 45, at 219 (emphasis added). 
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appeared to be better learners; but on other tests of learning ability, in which 
curiosity was not a factor, this effect could be eliminated.54 
The problem is that such studies are impossible in human populations; one 
cannot simply breed a new population of people and systematically test the 
effect of changing the environment they grow up in.  So one is left with the 
results of research done in a particular environment, and those results are of 
very limited generality.  A high heritability for behavioral tendencies such as 
antisocial behaviors or violence does not reveal the developmental causes of 
such behaviors or personalities.  Nor does it necessarily offer a window into 
how such behaviors might, or might not, be modified.  Again, variation in a 
particular trait can have a heritability of one hundred percent, yet a change in 
the developmental environment can result in the radical modification of that 
trait in part or all of the particular population.  As Figure 1 shows, any 
argument that the high heritability of maze-running ability in Cooper and 
Zubek’s rats in a normal laboratory environment signified the irrelevance of 
environmental interventions would be false. 
B. Differences and QTLs: Statistical Correlations Made Physical 
Improvements in gene mapping and sequencing over the last few decades 
have made finding genetic markers associated with phenotypic differences 
much easier.  Though the power of such techniques is still somewhat limited, 
further improvements can be expected to make finding the particular genes (or 
at least small chromosomal regions) associated with phenotypic differences 
possible, even when the associations are weak. One technique is quantitative 
trait loci (QTL) analysis. 
QTL analyses seek chromosomal regions that are statistically associated 
with differences in the particular phenotype of interest.  In medical genetics, 
QTL studies have revealed that variations in certain regions of particular 
chromosomes are associated with different likelihoods of disease; so, for 
example, women with mutations in the BRCA1 and/or BRCA2 genes are more 
likely to develop breast cancer than are women without those mutations, all else 
being equal.55  Importantly, these techniques are essentially statistical in nature.  
A successful QTL analysis reveals only that differences in a particular 
chromosomal region are associated with differences in the phenotype of 
interest; it does not provide information about the developmental pathways (if 
any) with which the genes in that region are involved.  Indeed, at least 
currently, QTL analyses do not find the gene or genes associated with any 
particular phenotypic variation.56  Instead, they simply identify the chromosomal 
region in which the putative gene can be supposed to lie.  And, of course, QTL 
 
 54. See Norman D. Henderson, Relative Effects of Early Rearing Environment and Genotype on 
Discrimination Learning in House Mice, 75 J. COMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 243, 247–48 (1972). 
 55. Andrea Veronsi et al., Familial Breast Cancer: Characteristics and Outcomes of BRCA 1-2 
Positive and Negative Cases, 5 BMC CANCER 70 (2005). 
 56. On the difficulties inherent in defining and identifying genes, see Box 1. 
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analyses are essentially a tool to be used for exploring differences in traits, such 
as how likely a person is to develop a disease or whether a person is more or 
less prone to violent behavior.  The analysis cannot discover the genes involved 
in the development of any traits for which there is no variation in the particular 
population involved.57 
It follows that a QTL analysis done in one environment might reveal an 
association between a particular chromosomal region and differences in a 
particular trait, but the same analysis done in another environment might reveal 
nothing.  Imagine if the genotypic difference between the maze-bright and the 
maze-dull rats was at a single locus.  In the normal environment, a QTL analysis 
would show an association of this locus with the difference in maze-running 
performance.  However, QTL analyses done in either the enriched or 
impoverished environments would reveal no associations between 
chromosomal regions and differences in maze-running ability. 
In fact, exactly this kind of plasticity has been reported in human behavioral 
genetics research focused on violence and antisocial behavior.  In the early 
1990s, researchers studied a family in the Netherlands in which many of the 
men (but none of the women) had a record of abnormal behavior (including 
violent and antisocial behaviors).  Biochemical testing revealed these men to be 
severely deficient in Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA), and genetic testing 
revealed a “nonsense point” mutation in the MAOA gene explaining the 
absence of MAOA.58  But it rapidly became clear that complete MAOA 
deficiency was extremely rare, and studies attempting to link partial MAOA 
deficiency to aggressive antisocial behavior tended to be inconclusive.59  A study 
subsequently performed on a population in Dunedin, New Zealand, considered 
the effects of the early developmental environment (mainly, the extent to which 
the developing child was exposed to physical abuse in the home) and found a 
strong relationship between growing up in an abusive household and the 
 
 57. See, e.g., Sober, supra note 22, at 48–55.  To explore how genes for which there is no natural 
variation in the pertinent population play roles in development, one can, in model organisms, design 
“knock out” experiments.  In such studies, the target gene is rendered nonfunctional at some point in 
development.  Alternatively, one can trace the activity of genes with RNA transcription in particular 
tissues.  But ethical restrictions prevent the use of knock-out studies in humans (it is also too hard to 
control for confounding factors in natural experiments), and they likewise prevent the results of micro-
array activation studies from being aggressively pursued.  For these reasons, naturally occurring genetic 
variation and appeals to the results of studies in model organisms remain the primary source for the 
generation and testing of hypotheses in the human case. 
 58. Han G. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Structural 
Gene for Monoamine Oxidase A., 262 SCIENCE 578, 579 (1993).  A nonsense point mutation is one that 
prevents the formation of a protein that is usually produced; because of the redundancy of the genetic 
code, some mutations will have little or no effect on the protein produced, and others will result in a 
different protein being produced.  Nonsense mutations stop transcription and prevent the protein from 
being produced. 
 59. See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi, Joseph McClay, Terrie E. Moffitt, Jonathan Mill, Judy Martin, Ian 
W. Craig, Alan Taylor & Richie Poulton, Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated 
Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002).  This study has not been replicated, and while it appears to have 
been very well performed, the results may not be general in the way suggested here.  But these doubts 
are secondary to the more significant conceptual issues discussed below. 
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likelihood of aggressive violent behavior later in life.  This association was much 
stronger in people with low levels of MAOA activity. 
In the Dunedin study, children were categorized according to the likely level 
of physical abuse in their homes, abuse generally directed at the children and 
their mothers.  Three categories of abuse were identified: “likely none,” 
“probable/moderate abuse,” and “likely severe abuse.”60  The likely MAOA 
level of the children was determined by the genotype of their MAOA promoter 
region.  Children who grew up in households rated as likely nonabusive had the 
same low risk of becoming violent adults, regardless of their level of MAOA.  
However, children who grew up in abusive households had a much greater risk 
of becoming violent adults if they had promoter regions associated with low-
MAOA activity than if they had promoter regions associated with high-MAOA 
activity.61 
Figure 2.  The Dunedin Study: A Generalized Norm of Reaction—The 
Relationship Between Childhood Abuse, Likely MAOA Level, and the Risk 



















This graph demonstrates the relative risk of antisocial behavior for adults who grew up 
in households with no abuse, probable abuse, or severe abuse, given likely low levels 
of MAOA or likely high levels of MAOA.  The difference between the risk of 
becoming a violent adult is not significantly different for children with low and high 
MAOA levels in houses without abuse or in houses with probable (and likely mild) 
abuse.  Children who grow up in households with severe physical abuse have a 
significantly higher risk of becoming violent adults than those who grew up in houses 
 
 60. Id., at 297. Based on previous studies, longer promoter regions were associated with greater 
MAOA activity. 


























03__KAPLAN.DOC 9/8/2006  3:48 PM 
70 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:47 
without abuse, whatever their MAOA levels.  But in those households, those with low 
MAOA levels have a significantly higher risk of this than do those with higher MAOA 
levels.  This graph does not highlight the extensive variation in antisocial behaviors 
within each category.62 
A QTL analysis would find an association between the MAOA promoter 
regions and antisocial behaviors only if the children were exposed to fairly 
serious abuse in their homes.  In other environments, the different promoter 
regions were not associated with statistically significant differences in the 
likelihood that violent or antisocial behaviors would develop.  This kind of 
plasticity may partly explain why it has been so difficult to replicate many of the 
studies that found loci associated with particular behavioral traits.63  Similarly, 
since in this case the heritability of antisocial behaviors will vary based on the 
prevalence of abuse in the society in question, studies of the heritability of 
antisocial behaviors will yield very different numbers in different social 
environments. 
The same problem—that genes associated with a difference in one 
environment may not be so associated in another environment—holds for 
differences in the genetic environment, as well.  Epistasis, the phenomenon in 
which genes affect the expression of other genes, is a central fact of 
development.  A gene associated with a particular form of a trait in one genetic 
context may not be associated with that form of the trait in another genetic 
context.64  Indeed, with several diseases associated with particular genes in 
humans, the different expression of the genes in individuals is likely to be 
associated with differences in their genetic background.  For example, how 
much the presence of genes associated with breast cancer raise one’s lifetime 
risk of breast cancer is currently an area of active research.  It seems likely that 
the answer depends on the presence of other genes.  For instance, in some 
genetic contexts the BRCA1/2 mutations may raise the lifetime risk of breast 
cancer to over eighty percent, whereas in the presence of other genes, the same 
mutations are associated with only a twenty percent lifetime risk.65 
Like studies of heritability, QTL analyses are a good first step in research 
aimed to untangle the complex developmental pathways involved.  Finding 
chromosomal regions associated with particular differences can provide an 
entry into research focused on understanding those developmental processes 
more generally.  For example, further work can be done narrowing the 
 
 62. Redrawn from Caspi et al., supra note 59. On the concept of a generalized norm of reaction see 
Sarkar & Fuller supra note 34, at 71. 
 63. See, e.g., D.C. Rowe, Assessing Genotype-Environment Interactions and Correlations in the 
Postgenomic Era, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS IN THE POSTGENOMIC ERA, supra note 18, at 71. 
 64. See the developmental rules above, especially rules 2 and 3. 
 65. See, e.g., Colin B. Begg, On the Use of Familial Aggregation in Population-Based Case 
Probands for Calculating Penetrance, 94 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1221, 1221 (2002) (reporting estimates 
of BRCA1/2 risks); accord Ulrich Wolf, Identical Mutations and Phenotypic Variation, 100 HUM. 
GENETICS 305 (1997) (examining similar data for cystic fibrosis, tumors, and a number of other human 
disorders); Barbara R. Grubb & Richard C. Boucher, Pathophysiology of Gene-Targeted Mouse 
Models for Cystic Fibrosis, 79 PHYSIOLOGICAL REV. 193 (1999) (examining the effect of the genetic 
background in mouse models). 
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chromosomal region and looking for particular candidate genes.  Differences 
found in these genes can be analyzed with an eye towards understanding what 
functional differences they make to development.  And that, of course, leads to 
the differences in development that matter to the production of different 
versions of the trait in question.  But, again, in the case of associations between 
genetic markers and human behavioral traits, such research is just the first step; 
all too often it suggests a promise for the future, not a conclusion for the 
present.  What gets reported and unwisely used in the framing of social and 
political debates, as well as in legal decisionmaking, is not the work that remains 
to be done (and the complex context that work involves), but that a “gene for” 
some behavioral trait or other has been discovered.66 
Research into the relationship between variation in the MAOA promoter 
regions and antisocial behaviors can reasonably claim to have gone beyond 
generating mere statistical associations.  For example, the MAOA system is 
known, at least in animal models, to be involved with metabolizing various 
neurotransmitters, and differences in neurotransmitters are implicated in 
behavioral differences (including aggression) in those model organisms.67  It is 
therefore hardly a stretch to suspect that the associations found involve causally 
salient differences at the level of the developmental pathways. 
Even so, it would be unwise to assume that the results of the Dunedin study 
will be easily replicated in other populations since development can be sensitive 
to many different environmental factors; so the correlations found in Dunedin 
may not be found elsewhere.  But even if Dunedin results do turn out to be 
typical, it is unclear what, if any, policy implications they might have.  After all, 
significant variation in antisocial behavior cannot be accounted for by 
associations between environments or by the different promoter regions.  That 
is, low-MAOA activity, even when coupled with growing up in a violent 
household, does not guarantee that a violent or antisocial adult will result; 
conversely, high-MAOA activity, even when coupled with growing up in a 
nonviolent household, does not guarantee that the result will be a nonviolent 
adult.  And surely the most important lesson of the Dunedin study is that 
growing up in a violent household is associated with an increased risk of 
antisocial behavior, whatever version of the promoter region one has. 
This suggests in part that—despite the claim of the Dunedin researchers that 
the link between low MAOA, childhood exposure to violence, and antisocial 
behavior implies that “these findings could inform the development of future 
pharmacological treatments”68—any reasonable public health approach to 
reducing the prevalence and impact of violent behaviors in society ought to 
 
 66. Jonathan M. Kaplan & Massimo Pigliucci, Genes ‘For’ Phenotypes: A Modern History View, 16 
BIOLOGY & PHIL. 189 (2001) (providing examples and a general critique of speaking about a gene 
being “for” a phenotype). 
 67. See, e.g., Brunner et al., supra note 58, (correlating a mutation in part of “the MAOA structural 
gene” with an increase in impulsive aggression). 
 68. See Caspi, supra note 59, at 853. 
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focus on reducing violent abuse in the home rather than on MAOA levels.  No 
pharmacological interventions are currently available; but even if they were, 
they would still very likely be less effective than programs aimed at reducing the 
prevalence of domestic violence.  And given the other effects of domestic 
violence (including not only the direct physical and psychological harms, but 
also such subtler harms as the reduction of IQ scores in children exposed to 
domestic violence),69 even if such programs were not wholly successful, they 
would still seem to be more worthwhile than pharmacological interventions. 
From the standpoint of human behavioral genetics research more generally, 
limits in the current understanding of the developmental pathways that produce 
particular personality types or behavioral tendencies are to be expected; such 
limits do not count as a criticism of the field.  Indeed, that substantial variation 
in the particular behaviors cannot be associated with variation in either genetic 
or environmental developmental resources should be expected in the study of 
any complex behavior, or, for that matter, that of any complex trait more 
generally.70  But these limits mean that current research does not point towards 
any substantial predictive abilities respecting the behavior of individuals.  Any 
public policy implications drawn from this research are very limited, indeed, 
and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. 
C. Evolutionary Accounts 
Some researchers interested in human behavioral genetics have appealed to 
evolutionary accounts of particular behavioral traits.  These appeals have taken 
several distinct forms.  For instance, evolutionary psychology aims to uncover 
universal developmental systems that could be adaptive responses that evolved 
to solve particular kinds of problems in ancestral humans.71  So some hypotheses 
suggest that the development of linguistic ability in humans was a solution to 
the problem of social coordination, and that the preference for sweet, high-fat 
foods as a solution to the problem of food choice for hunter-gatherers in 
broadly unstable environments.  Evolutionary psychiatry is a related project 
that attempts to account for particular kinds of psycho-pathologies by reference 
to the mismatch between an adaptive behavioral response in the ancestral 
environment and current environmental conditions.72  Insofar as a taste for high-
fat foods is no longer adaptive (because it is associated with obesity), an 
evolved preference for such foods would represent a mismatch of this sort.  
Researchers engaged in more traditional behavioral genetics research will 
 
 69. See, e.g., Karestan C. Koenen, Terrie E. Moffitt, Avshalom Caspi, Alan Taylor & Shaun 
Purcell, Domestic Violence is Associated with Environmental Suppression of IQ in Young Children, 15 
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 297 (2003). 
 70. See the developmental rules above, especially rule 7. 
 71. See, e.g., JEROME H. BARKOW, LEDA COSMIDES & JOHN TOOBY, THE ADAPTED MIND: 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 3 (1992). 
 72. See MICHAEL MCGUIRE & ALFONSO TROISI, DARWINIAN PSYCHIATRY vii–x (1998). 
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sometimes appeal to evolutionary accounts in order to explain the continued 
presence of particular kinds of heritable variation in traits.73 
However, evolutionary psychology has been widely criticized, and these 
criticisms apply in large part to evolutionary psychiatry as well.74  The primary 
difficulty with accounts of the adaptive evolution of human behaviors is that 
studying evolutionary adaptations in humans is notoriously difficult. All the 
standard techniques used in evolutionary biology to gather evidence that 
phenotypic traits (including behaviors) are adaptations are either impossible to 
perform or of somewhat limited use in humans.75  Moving from a plausible 
account of how a particular behavioral tendency might have been adaptive in 
some ancestral environment to being able to provide compelling evidence that 
the tendency is itself an adaptation is, at best, very difficult. 
 
Box 4: Evolutionary accounts and human adaptations 
 
The following table lists some standard techniques used to find evidence in 
support of adaptive hypotheses in evolutionary biology, the kind of evidence 
each technique is supposed to gather, and the difficulties with using that 
technique in the human case. 
 
 
 73. See, e.g., Henry C. Harpending & Patricia Draper, Antisocial Behavior and the Other Side of 
Cultural Evolution, in BIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CRIME CAUSATION 293, 293 (Terrie E. 
Moffitt & Sarnoff A. Mednick eds., 1988) (developing a theoretical framework “in which antisocial 
behavior makes evolutionary sense”). 
 74. See, e.g., DAVID J. BULLER, ADAPTING MINDS: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
PERSISTENT QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE 93-106 (2005) (arguing that there are “intractable obstacles 
to discovering our psychological adaptations via evolutionary” analysis because (1) it is impossible to 
specify what adaptive problems our ancestors faced or what would solve them, and (2) even if we could 
determine how our ancestors adapted, “no reliable chain of inference” connects our ancestor’s adaptive 
problems to our current problems); Jonathan M. Kaplan, Historical Evidence and Human Adaptations, 
69 PHIL. SCIENCE 294 (2002) (arguing that it is difficult or impossible to apply information from even 
the closest extant relatives to humans to evolutionary psychology because (1) either the traits studied 
are not widely shared in the species, or (2) the difference between humans and their relatives is big 
enough that any information about the relatives is likely too simplistic). 
 75. See Box 4. 
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(laboratory or field).  In 
these studies, the trait in 
question is modified by 
the researcher. 
Fitness consequences of 
the traits in question, 
causal mechanisms 
associated with traits and 
fitness consequences. 
Ethical constraints; no 
controls in natural 
cases (trauma, genetic 
diseases, etc.). 
Transplant studies.  In 
these studies, organisms 
are physically moved 
from one location to 
another location with a 
different environment. 
Fitness consequences, 
hypotheses about local 
selective pressures, 
hypotheses about local 
adaptations to local 
environmental factors. 
Ethical constraints; 
few ways to control for 
confounding variables 




Laboratory evolution.  
Here, populations of 
organisms are kept and 
bred under controlled 
conditions. 
Robustness of pathways 
(given the same 
environment, does the 
same trait develop?), 
strength of constraints. 
Ethical constraints; 
also, humans are very 
poor model organisms 
due in part to their 
long lifespans. 
Optimism analyses.  
These investigate what 
the best trait would be, 
given some ancestral 
version of the trait, 










knowledge of relevant 
selective history. 
Phylogenetic analyses. 
These studies focus on 
the history of the lineage 
of the organisms in 
question—what traits do 
they share or not share 
with other species that 
share a recent common 
ancestor? 
History of trait; 
homology (shared trait 
derived from common 
ancestor) versus 




populated clade (few 
extant relations, none 
of them very close); 
little known about 
environment of 
speciation events. 
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Regression analyses and 
comparative analyses.  
These compare 
particular versions of 
various traits to each 




trait and environmental 
variables, strength of 
relationship, relationship 
between trait and fitness, 
relationship between 
trait and other traits. 
Very little known 
about environment-
trait relationships; 
little known about 







Nevertheless, evolutionary accounts that attempt to explain the prevalence 
of violent behaviors in societies have been presented in the literature.  These 
include models that link the development of particular kinds of violent 
tendencies to particular environments, as well as models of frequency-
dependent selection that maintains genetic variation for a propensity to 
violence.  An example of the first is an influential article in which Margo Wilson 
and Martin Daly argue that many behavioral features of “violent criminals” 
who grew up in “high-crime” neighborhoods could be explained as rational, 
adaptive responses to the particular developmental environments in which they 
found themselves.76  Working within the framework of evolutionary psychology, 
Wilson and Daly hypothesize that human psychological development reveals 
adaptive plasticity with respect to particular kinds of developmental 
environments.  They argue that the development of human behavioral 
tendencies is determined by a number of universal developmental programs 
that respond to local environmental variation in ways that would have been 
adaptive in the environments in which their ancestors evolved.  All people share 
the same potential to develop various psychological traits; whether they actually 
develop any particular trait will depend on the developmental environment 
they experience.77 
Since our brains evolved to solve “important” problems regarding 
maximizing reproductive success within complex social systems, Wilson and 
Daly suggest that we should expect to find that behavioral tendencies will vary 
based on the developmental environment encountered and that we should thus 
be especially sensitive to the social environment.  One upshot of this is that 
everyone will share the same potential to become a violent adult; whether 
someone actually becomes a violent adult will depend on whether he or she 
experiences environments that, in the past, made being violent a good strategy 
to adopt.78  In environments in which the average lifespan is relatively long, 
rates of violent death relatively low, opportunities for low-risk social 
 
 76. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Life Expectancy, Economic Inequality, Homicide, and 
Reproductive Timing in Chicago Neighbourhoods, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 1271 (1997). 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 1271–72. 
 78. See, e.g., id. at 1273–74; see generally MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988). 
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advancement widely available, and reasonable levels of social success widely 
distributed (that is, social environments with relatively low levels of social 
inequality), Wilson and Daly suggest that adopting a long time-horizon would 
be adaptive (which is to say, such a strategy will tend to increase reproductive 
fitness).  This would include delaying reproduction, pursuing relatively low-risk, 
long-term strategies, and avoiding risk-taking—behaviors that all lead to 
broadly nonviolent psychological features.  On the other hand, in environments 
in which the average lifespan is relatively short and the chance of dying early 
through violence is relatively high, in which there are large social inequalities 
and low-risk strategies are unlikely to accrue reasonable amounts of social 
success (so-called “winner take all” societies), and in which risk-taking may 
have large social rewards, Wilson and Daly argue it is in fact adaptive to adopt a 
short time-horizon.  This would include early reproduction, high-risk pursuits, 
and high-reward strategies, including violent ones. 
Wilson and Daly claim the neighborhood patterns of life expectancy, 
homicide rates, and reproductive timing in the United States conform to this 
hypothesis.79  Neighborhoods with relatively little violence are those with 
relatively long life expectancies (and better overall health), relatively little 
economic inequality (and overall reasonably high incomes), and relatively 
numerous educational and economic opportunities.  The most violent 
neighborhoods are those with relatively short life expectancies (and poor 
overall health), great economic inequality (and overall very low incomes), and 
relatively few educational and economic opportunities.80 
Based on such data, some authors suggest searching for biological 
differences between more and less violent people may, in general, be pointless.81  
Instead, the differences between people may not lie in different biologies per se 
but rather in the different developmental environments to which the people 
were exposed.  Although different developmental environments may produce 
different behavioral phenotypes that are related to different brain chemistries, 
for example, these latter features are best thought of as caused by 
environmental differences.82 
Evolutionary psychology as a field has come under serious attack,83 but its 
methodological weaknesses and poorly supported assumptions are not, 
fundamentally, the most serious problems facing its published results.  Indeed, 
although Wilson and Daly acknowledge the “daunting” number of complex 
“feedback loops” in the pathways between the developmental environment, 
reasonable expectations regarding life expectancies and life strategies involving 
 
 79. Wilson & Daly, supra note 76, at 1273–74. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Alan Gibbard, Genetic Plans, Genetic Differences, and Violence: Some Chief Possibilities, in 
GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 169, 192–94 (David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit eds., 
2001). 
 82. See, e.g., id.; Vernon L. Quinsey, Evolutionary Theory and Criminal Behaviour, 7 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2002). 
 83. See Kaplan, supra note 74. 
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violence do not, and cannot, address the developmental biology of the 
behaviors in question.  From the standpoint of how, developmentally, particular 
behaviors come to be expressed in particular individuals, these kinds of 
evolutionary accounts are silent. 
Rather, the kind of evolutionary approach favored by Wilson and Daly is 
supposed to reveal the ultimate causes of violent behaviors84—to explain why 
such behaviors exist, not how those behaviors develop.  For this reason, such 
approaches count as behavioral genetics only insofar as the evolution of stable 
developmental pathways involves the selection and maintenance of particular 
genes.  However, it has become increasingly clear that adaptations may not 
involve the selection of particular genes, but rather the selection of 
developmental mechanisms that result in the resources available (including 
genetic resources) being used in different ways.85  So, even if a particular set of 
evolutionary accounts is correct, it may not point towards particular genes that 
are uniquely involved in the production of the behaviors in question. 
It may be that projects like these that attempt to uncover ultimate, 
evolutionary accounts would be intellectually interesting if they were better 
supported,86 but because they do not address the causal pathways involved, they 
cannot support arguments surrounding individual differences in behavior 
except through the statistical associations between those behaviors and 
particular environments.  As it is already well established that growing up in a 
violent society with high levels of economic and social inequality and so on is 
statistically associated with becoming a violent adult, the additional 
evolutionary account does not seem to add anything to the explanation of 
differences within particular populations.  It certainly adds nothing that would 
be of value to social policies directed at individual variations in behaviors. 
A second approach to using evolutionary accounts to explain violent human 
behaviors links genetic variation associated with behavioral differences to the 
likelihood of antisocial or violent behavior.87  It does so by appealing to 
evolutionary accounts that could generate or maintain such genetic variations, 
either between or within populations.  In the case of between-population 
differences, people in different populations might face different environments 
due either to the structure of the societies or to other local environmental 
features.  These differences might, in turn, lead to local populations adapting to 
 
 84. See, e.g., Quinsey, supra note 82, at 1–2 (explaining the concept of “ultimate” causes compared 
to “proximal” causes in this context). 
 85. See, e.g., MOSS, supra note 6, at 75–116. 
 86. But see Richard Lewontin, The Evolution of Cognition: Questions We Will Never Answer, in 4 
METHODS, MODELS, AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 107,  118–
130 (Don Scarborough & Saul Sternberg eds., 1998) (presenting a compelling argument that, in this 
case, the required evidence is not, and will never be, available). 
 87. See Ian Pitchford, The Origins of Violence: Is Psychopathy an Adaptation? 1 HUM. NATURE 
REV. 28 (2001); Harpending & Draper, supra note 73, at 293–307. 
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these local features and hence having different distributions of genes.88  In the 
case of within-population differences, an evolutionary equilibrium might occur 
in which different strategies, associated with different genetic features, might 
exist at stable levels.  However, neither the account in terms of equilibrium 
strategies nor the account in terms of local adaptations does much to explain 
the differences in rates of violence between or within populations, and neither 
has been seriously investigated in recent years, so neither is particularly helpful 
in explaining associations between genes, behavior, and environment. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: EVIDENCE AND THE USES OF EVIDENCE 
Despite well over a quarter-century of criticism of the methodological 
limitations of human behavioral genetics research and the weak evidence 
offered for linking particular variations in human behaviors to particular 
biological features,89 the standards required to publish and publicize particular 
claims in human behavioral genetics still remain disappointingly low.  This 
should not come as a surprise: in nonhuman behavioral genetics and in 
evolutionary biology more generally, the evidence generally required to link 
particular behaviors to particular biological differences or to particular accounts 
of adaptation is also relatively weak.  But there is an important difference.  In 
the case of accounts involving, say, locally adapted populations of plants or fruit 
flies, the willingness to formulate and publish hypotheses on the basis of weak 
evidence is not deeply problematic.  Nor is the acceptance or rejection of any 
particular adaptive account based on nonhuman studies; even if criticism of 
poor evidence and new hypotheses does not occur for some time, it is unlikely 
that any real or lasting harm will be done by the (temporary) acceptance of the 
original, poorly supported hypothesis about plants or fruit flies. 
The situation in commercial plant and animal breeding might be considered 
rather different.  Here, mistaken hypotheses, if not discovered quickly, could be 
costly. But commercial plant and animal breeders have important advantages 
over researchers hoping to understand the development of traits in natural 
populations.  Studies relevant to commercial plant and animal breeding can, 
and do, control the environments in which the experiments are performed.  This 
is not problematic in the least, as the goal is not to mimic some range of natural 
environments, but rather to recreate the artificial environments in which those 
 
 88. See Massimo Pigliucci & Jonathan Kaplan, On the Concept of Biological Race and its 
Applicability to Humans, in 70 PHIL. OF SCI. 1161 (Supp. 2003) (discussing the possibility of human 
ecotypes (locally adapted populations)). 
 89. See generally PHILIP KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR 
HUMAN NATURE (1985); RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA 
(1991); Richard C. Lewontin, The Evolution of Cognition: Questions We Will Never Answer, in 
METHODS, MODELS, AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, supra note 75, at 107. RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, 
STEVEN ROSE & LEON J. KAMIN, NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE 
(1984); HILARY ROSE & SEVEN ROSE, ALAS POOR DARWIN (2000); MICHAEL RUSE, 
SOCIOBIOLOGY: SENSE OR NONSENSE? (2d ed. 1979). 
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plants or animals are usually raised.  For this reason, studies involving 
commercial plant and animal breeding do not need to control for the 
manipulation of their subjects; the subjects of such studies are always 
manipulated. 
Similarly, in principle it would be possible to pursue human behavioral 
genetics research that would be accurate, as long as one could selectively breed 
humans in controlled environments, and as long as all one wanted to know was 
the relationship between particular genes and particular behaviors in those 
populations and in those controlled environments.  However, even if such 
studies were ethically feasible (not to mention practically feasible), they would 
still be inadequate for understanding the relationship between variation in 
human genetics and variation in human behavior.  Human behavioral genetics 
is not—and ought not be—interested in the relationship between particular 
genes and particular behaviors in some particular, artificially structured 
population and in some artificially controlled environment.  The goal of 
behavioral genetics is not to find associations that hold true within artificial 
environments or artificially created populations.  Rather, the environments of 
interest to human behavioral genetics are those natural environments in which 
the populations of interest develop. 
Further, insofar as human behavioral genetics is expected to generate 
research results with public policy implications, there are good reasons to reject 
any research model that fails to focus on the actual environments encountered 
during development and on the actual populations experiencing those 
environments.  Public policy decisions cannot be sensibly made on the basis of 
what might happen to a particular population in a particular controlled 
environment.  Rather, such decisions should take into account the ways in 
which the developmental environments encountered vary, within populations, 
between populations, and especially over time. 
Even if contemporary approaches to finding biological correlates to violent, 
antisocial, or criminal behavior are successful, the research results are unlikely 
to contribute meaningfully to shaping public policy, to making better legal 
decisions, or to improving our understanding of the causes of violence within 
societies.  Because contemporary techniques cannot reveal the causal pathways 
of development in the human case, they cannot be used to predict how 
particular developmental resources will be used in different developmental 
environments.  Hence, they cannot predict the results of any particular social 
policies.  Changes in social policy are, after all, environmental changes, and 
changes in the developmental environment may well change the associations 
between particular genes and particular behaviors.  As a result, any social 
changes made in response to research might change the associations uncovered 
by the research itself.  The conceptual limitations of the techniques employed 
by these research programs simply do not permit the results of such research to 
be used in the kinds of explanations or predictions that could meaningful 
influence social policy. 
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A substantial literature is emerging from moral philosophy, legal studies, 
and the social sciences on how to deal with possible discoveries of links between 
biology and violent crime.  Various authors have argued that some possible 
discoveries would force a major rethinking of basic moral intuitions or major 
revisions in the public policies surrounding violent crime.90  In these 
hypothetical cases, one is often asked to imagine discovering biological 
correlates to criminal violence that predispose an individual to commit violent 
acts in every possible developmental environment or biological correlates that 
make an individual much more impulsive and thus more unable to control his or 
her temptations than the norm.91  More dramatically, one could imagine 
discovering biological pathways that make it certain an individual will commit 
violent acts—pathways that would determine him or her to be a violent or 
antisocial adult.92 
Interesting as they are, perhaps, as an intellectual exercise, these 
hypothetical cases should not be permitted to distract from what is already 
known about how to reduce the prevalence and ameliorate the impact of 
violent, antisocial, and criminal behaviors.  And despite the over-bold claims of 
some human behavioral genetics researchers, it is not at all likely that more 
biological data would even help in reducing such behaviors.  Rather, what 
seems to be missing from attempts to deal seriously with these problems is a 
willingness to act on what is already known about techniques for reducing them.  
It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that people concerned with actually 
reducing the prevalence and impact of violent behavior in societies or interested 
in finding ways to reform the legal and penal systems should focus on these 
broader political questions.  To reduce the prevalence and ameliorate the 
impact of violent, antisocial, and criminal behavior within societies, such people 
should treat biological research as, at best, intriguing distractions from the hard 
work ahead. 
 
 90. See especially Part II of GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 10. 
 91. See Marcia Baron, Crime, Genes, and Responsibility, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, 
supra note 10, at 204–05. 
 92. See Peter Van Inwagen, Genes, Statistics, and Desert, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, 
supra note 10, at 225 (discussing the moral culpability of individuals genetically predisposed to commit 
violent acts). 
